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Abstract: Institutional investors play a central role in corporate finance and ownership. 
But their direct role in corporate governance has received only limited attention, focused 
mainly on shareholder activism, with its focus on strategic change and rapid improvement in 
corporate performance. Following the financial crisis, however, policy has sought ways to 
counteract the perceived short-termism in equity markets. It has cast a spotlight on the role 
of investors, not least in the UK, with its Stewardship Code (introduced in 2010 and revised 
in 2012) and in related moves in a number of European countries and by the European 
Union. In the US too, policy has paid special attention to questions of proxy access and 
enhancing shareholder rights to voice. They share a concern to evoke the spirit of the 
‘universal owner’, interested in both the long term and in the broad development of the 
economy as a whole. This paper examines developments in the policy against the backdrop 
of changing practices and structures, raising doubts about the premises of the policy 
direction and discussing the promises and drawbacks alternatives within other forms of 
ownership.  
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1. Introduction 
Institutional investors have long played a central role in corporate governance but no more 
so than since the financial crisis of 2007-09, when policymakers turned to them to act as if 
they were ‘owners’ with a stake in the long-term future of the companies in which they 
invest.  The trend began in the UK with its Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010), followed by the 
Kay Review (2012) to counteract short-termism. France (Commission Europe, 2010; ORSE, 
2011) and Germany (discussed in Roth, 2012), among other countries, took similar actions, 
while the European Union (European Commission, 2011, 2013) included investor 
engagement in its review of corporate governance.  
In the US the Dodd-Frank Act (Library of Congress, 2010) gave shareholders new 
voting powers (e.g. say-on-pay) and made it easier to raise shareholder resolutions (i.e. 
proxy access). The European Union sought to amend its Shareholder Rights Directive to 
empower investors (European Commission, 2014). Some institutional investors that favour 
this approach now call themselves ‘shareowners’ rather than ‘shareholders’ (e.g. Butler and 
Wong, 2011). The thrust of each of these policy moves assumes that shareholders are able to 
prevent corporate excess and with certain incentives would want to. But the policy initiatives 
face obstacles arising from the changing structure and power balances in institutional 
investment, in particular the growth of foreign ownership, funds-of-funds, sovereign wealth, 
and even from a revival of shareholder activism, promulgated by activist hedge funds. 
In his paper ‘After the corporation’, Davis (2013) provocatively argues that both 
scholarship on organisations and industrial policy are based on an outdated conceptualisation 
of the corporation. The disaggregation of production functions across industries makes the 
corporation of yore a relic of a previous industrial age. In the US at least, the old giants made 
up a large part of the social structure and services that has held society together. What 
happens to the structure of society ‘after the corporation’, he asks?  
This paper turns that spotlight on investors. The policy push towards stewardship evokes 
a bygone era of family-owned enterprises and corporations controlled by grand financiers. 
But the patient capital of Warren Buffett is a model few follow, or could (Bushee, 2004). 
New money from end-investors increasing flows instead into funds-of-funds, detaching the 
end beneficiary even further from control.1 Setting public policy to make finance serve the 
whole economy as envisaged in the ‘universal owner’ (Hawley and Williams, 2007; Urwin, 
2011) - modelled on the large pension fund – seems a laudable goal. The economic interests 
of such investors, this theory argues, lie more in long-term advances of society as a whole 
than in short-term profits from share-trading. 
But in view of the changes in investment, there is a danger such policy prescriptions are 
anachronistic and may even privilege a dying class of investor against other more vibrant 
ones. Moreover, they may legitimate shareholder primacy at a time when scholars and the 
rest of the policy framework question it (Armour et al., 2003; Bainbridge, 2010; Stout, 
2013). We – scholars, policymakers and practitioners alike – need to consider alternatives. 
Within the system of wealth creation and like the corporation, the traditional investor – 
including the universal owner – remains an important economic force. But institutional 
changes, working within the market system, will work as these investors decline as a social 
force?  
This paper questions the efficacy and legitimacy of policy prescriptions that rely upon 
institutional investors acting as universal owners. It starts by depicting the tension between 
ownership in theory and practice. It then sketches of the extensive theoretical and policy-
oriented debate over question of shareholder primacy and the assumption that underpins it of 
shareholder value maximisation as the driving force of corporate decision-making. This 
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conceptualisation of corporate ‘ownership’ is then set against the backdrop of the investment 
landscape as it has developed over the past three decades.  
Next, we will consider several examples of the policy attempts, including in detail the 
UK Stewardship Code, showing the gap between policy expectations and potential outcomes 
in practice, in particular in light of the recent emergence of hedge fund activism. We then 
discuss alternative approaches to achieve the policy aims, focusing on possibly remedies in 
institutionalising a preference for other ownership forms.  
2. ‘Ownership’ in theory and practice 
In the pre-industrial era, business ownership was simple. Unlimited liability and direct 
communication between capital, labour, suppliers and customers meant that markets exerted 
a strong and personal governing influence on business management even without the price 
mechanism. Reputation was an attribute of people, not brands. But the technical innovations 
that led to industrialisation required the aggregation of capital, which led to the limitation of 
owner liability in the joint stock company. As the process continued, it created what Berle 
and Means (1932/1991) famously called the ‘modern corporation’, where investors held 
small stakes in large enterprises and knowledgeable managers enjoyed positions of power 
over distant and fragmented owners. Ownership had become separated from control. Berle 
and Means described a US phenomenon, but it was one copied in many ways in Britain after 
the Second World War (Franks et al., 2005) and emulated with variations as capital markets 
grew more international in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The agency problem (Fama, 1980) came to dominate the emerging literature on 
corporate governance. Agency theory sees excess and avoidable costs arising from 
management shirking their responsibilities to owners or expropriating company assets for 
their personal use. The prescriptions of agency theory involve using equity-based incentives 
to align the interests of managers with shareholders and freeing up a market for corporate 
control as a disciplinary tool. In addition, agency theory has been cited as justification for 
policy requiring broader and deeper disclosure to reduce information asymmetries and 
stronger shareholder rights to enable monitoring, even though these may offer at best only 
partial solutions (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012).  
Such monitoring involves costs that some investors are unwilling to incur. But in the 
normative literature, and in particular among legal scholars of corporate governance, a theme 
developed suggesting that a category of investors had incentives to engage in monitoring, 
termed the ‘universal owner’. The term came into wide use building on the textbook written 
by Robert Monks and Nell Minow (1995), themselves activist investors with a long-term 
orientation. They argued that some investors, and in particular pension funds, invest across 
the whole economy and thus have interests to see the economy as a whole improve, not just 
particular stocks or sectors.  
Moreover, in view of the long-term nature of their liabilities, proponents of this view 
argue that such investors have a fiduciary duty to take a long-term view of their assets 
(Hawley and Williams, 2000, 2007). In this view, such investors are likely to have duties and 
interests aligned with a public policy direction encouraging private investment in businesses 
with sustainable operations and profitability. Universal owners have little to gain from short-
term trading profits, especially if trading encourages managers to take a short-term view of 
business opportunities. This sense of ownership is a particular one, however. It involves a 
long investment horizon, a wide breadth of actual investments (rather than just breadth of 
opportunities to invest), and a sense of commitment. As we examine next, another concept of 
ownership is in wide use in company law and practice. 
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2.1 ‘Ownership’ in law and beyond 
Legal scholars and practitioners alike consider ownership as a concept arising in property 
rights. Ownership involves a certain bundle of rights. Glackin (2014) traces this usage to 
John Lewis in 1888 in his Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States, an 
idea developed further in the writings of Wesley Hohfeld (1920). This liberal and 
individualist view sees property ownership involving the freedom to dispose of property as 
the owner wishes, subject only to certain overriding constraints (e.g. eminent domain). 
Outright ownership of a business, in which the owner has unlimited personal liability, 
involves considerable rights.  
The invention of limited liability and the creation of a legal personality for the company 
involved a change in the bundle. Owners of shares in the company have only limited rights. 
These vary by jurisdiction, but broadly they concern the right to elect directors, the right to 
vote on changes to the articles of association, and the right to approve certain material 
changes in the nature of the business, often to do with takeover bids and mergers (Siems, 
2008). Shareholders have the right to receive a dividend, but the board of directors is under 
no obligation to pay one. Crucially, shareholders have no rights over the assets of the 
company and no right to withdraw their capital.  
This sense of ownership is not only limited in terms of rights, it also represents a narrow 
view of what ownership means in common parlance. People feel a sense of ownership when 
they identify with something, when it becomes part of their personality. They do not possess 
the ‘target’ of ownership we see in the bundle of rights approach; they care about it, become 
one with it. This is a psychological – cognitive and emotional – investment, not just a 
material or financial one (Sikavica and Hillman, 2008). In the literature of organisation 
studies, such ownership appears in the case of employees (Pierce et al., 2001) and is 
sometimes used by stakeholder theorists to justify that employees as well as shareholders 
have a residual risk in a company (Brink, 2010). McNulty and Nordberg (2015) argue that 
the care, identification and commitment in psychological ownership underpins some aspects 
of the policy attempts to promote stewardship.  
2.2 Policy attempts to promote ‘ownership’ 
In various papers and policy interventions, Monks uses a market-based rationale in 
advocating engaged share ownership. But his writings raise the spectre of a systemic failure 
(e.g. 'Capitalism without owners will fail,' Monks and Sykes, 2002), a view that, in the wake 
of the financial crisis of 2007-09, other polemicists saw as prophetic ('Capitalism without 
owners has failed,' Resta and Davies, 2011). In cases of market failure, the alternative voiced 
in the traditional dichotomy in political economy is state intervention. Policy moves in 
Europe since the crisis have relied more on ‘nudge’ tactics2 and voluntary codes, rather than 
the brute force of law and regulation. 
One such policy approach involves the concept of stewardship on the part of investors, 
that is, to encourage institutional investors to act in ways that promote better understanding 
of the forces affect long-term corporate performance, and with a sense of duty to the broader, 
long-term interests of their beneficiaries, that is, their end-investors. The concept of 
stewardship was promulgated in the United Kingdom, where the failures of corporate 
governance at UK banks identified in the Walker Review (2009) led to development of the 
UK Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010, 2012). In its revised version, it calls for institutional 
investors to engage with corporate management and boards in a constructive way across a 
range of issues: 
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For investors, stewardship is more than just voting. Activities may include 
monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as strategy, 
performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including 
culture and remuneration. Engagement is purposeful dialogue with 
companies on these matters as well as on issues that are the immediate 
subject of votes at general meetings (FRC, 2012, p. 1). 
In this passage, ‘monitoring’ is a separate activity from ‘engaging’. The former includes 
carrying out meetings with the board chairman or other board members, attending the 
general meetings (Principle 3), or escalating their activities ‘as a method of protecting and 
enhancing shareholder value’ (Principle 4). The latter involves dialogue – listening as well as 
speaking – and specifically listening to explanations of why a company chooses not to 
follow the prescriptions of the UK Corporate Governance Code. This is, therefore, a 
recommendation seeking a relationship, not just an expression of rights.  
The UK Stewardship Code draws a distinction between ‘asset managers’ and ‘asset 
owners’, with the latter identified broadly as ‘pension funds, insurance companies, 
investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles’ who ‘set the tone’ for stewardship 
(FRC, 2012, p. 1). Asset managers, by contrast, have day-to-day responsibility for managing 
investments; they generally work as agents for asset owners, their principals. Although the 
shareholder is in law the entity recorded on the share register, and therefore in the FRC’s 
terminology the asset manager, the emphasis of this code is that the principal’s interests are 
paramount, even if that is not what the law itself states. That is, it seeks to emphasise the 
agent’s duty to the principal as the basis for stewardship.  
Through promulgating a discourse valorising ‘asset owners’, the Stewardship Code 
seeks to effect ‘behavioural changes that lead to better stewardship’ from asset managers 
and, by extension, investee companies (FRC, 2015, p. 1). As asset owners pledge support for 
the code, pressure should build on asset managers, with their more immediate, ‘day-to-day 
responsibility’(FRC, 2012, p. 1) to engage with companies. Similarly the code envisages that 
companies will therefore listen more to asset owners’ concerns. According to an assessment 
published in early 2015, the UK Stewardship Code has attracted about 300 signatories, 
providing ‘potential for a critical mass of oversight and engagement’, yet ‘despite these 
improvements, too many signatories fail to follow-through’ (FRC, 2015, p. 1).  
The UK Stewardship Code spawned similar initiatives around the world, including ones 
in Germany (discussed in Roth, 2012) and France (Commission Europe, 2010; ORSE, 
2011). Similar moves followed in countries including Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
latterly Japan. Like the UK Stewardship Code, these efforts encourage investor engagement 
without direct state intervention. That is, these are voluntary arrangements, encouraged by 
regulators but not required. Investors are not required to publish their voting records, let 
alone detail the timing and substance of their interventions with corporate management and 
boards.  
The European Commission’s Green Paper on corporate governance (2011) also raised 
questions about the role of institutional investors promoting corporate decision-making 
focused on the long-term. Its follow-up Green Paper on long-term finance (European 
Commission, 2013) linked it to industrial policy initiatives with respect in particular to 
infrastructure and energy development, and the need to fund innovation for tasks including 
climate change. Green papers focus on idea generation more than policymaking, but these 
one served to reinforce a discourse of investor stewardship in policy discussions. The current 
debate over amending the EU Shareholder Rights Directive (European Commission, 2014) 
involves a variety of mechanisms to encourage engagement by institutional investors. 
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Both voluntary and regulative directions have detractors, supported by theoretical 
arguments and empirical information. But as we shall examine next, basing policy on the 
assumption that investors have the interests (economic) and interest (affective) in engaging is 
open to question. And developments in equity capital markets in the past 25 years suggest 
that those that might are a diminishing force. We illustrate this point with what is perhaps an 
extreme example – the UK – but an important one because of its centrality in the policy 
debate.  
3. Practical impediments to ‘ownership’ 
In developing their model of ‘active ownership’, McNulty and Nordberg (2015) highlight 
several ways that market mechanisms and institutional arrangements associated with public 
companies impede the development of the psychological commitment associated with 
stewardship. In addition, and while policy efforts to harmonise voting arrangements in 
Europe have had some effect, shareholders still face difficulties exercising the basic right to 
vote at annual meetings when it involves crossing national boundaries (European 
Commission, 2006). Well justified regulatory restrictions on shareholders acting in concert 
and thus disadvantaging other shareholders also paradoxically constrain shareholders’ voice 
and reduce their ability to discipline corporate management (Santella et al., 2012, pp. 279-
281).  
Moreover, aspects of the investment industry itself get in the way of stewardship. One is 
that mutual funds and other collective investments face particular performance pressures 
from the quarterly performance metrics that drive decisions of their own investors. Asset 
managers working on behalf of pension funds have similar issues on an annual basis. 
Popular opinion has highlighted the problem active fund managers – those that select 
individual investments – face in achieving good fund performance, that is, in beating the 
index. As a result, low-cost index-tracking funds now absorb the majority of funds under 
management in most places, and their low-cost business model leaves little room to pay for 
engagement.   
And cost is not just an issue for index-trackers. Engagement with companies involves a 
present cost with a rather uncertain future benefit. Across a widely diversified portfolio, even 
low-key engagement, using less costly, non-decision-making staff, can cost millions of 
dollars/pounds/euros. Engaging in the ‘purposeful dialogue’ on matters of ‘strategy, 
performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including culture and 
remuneration’ or giving ‘careful’ consideration of explanations of non-compliance with the 
corporate governance code envisaged in the UK Stewardship Code (FRC, 2012, pp. 6, 7) 
involves substantial resource commitment. Is it any wonder, then, that engagement tends to 
be restricted to cases of controversy, where the decisions at stake have substantial impact, or 
that routine engagement is often outsourced to agencies?  
Moreover, benefits relating to the costs incurred by engaged investors in successful 
stewardship accrue to all investors, engaged or otherwise. Gilson and Gordon (2013) see 
investors as ‘rationally reticent’, unwilling to initiate interaction with companies while 
willing to respond to the interventions of others. They see this as a justification for the role 
of activist investors, such as some hedge funds, seeking specific changes where they see a 
tangible and likely benefit. Their campaigns then attract other investors. As we discuss in the 
next section, this form of engagement can clash with the policy direction towards 
‘purposeful dialogue’ on strategy and other matters, or even the ‘careful consideration’ of 
explanations companies might give to not complying with codes of corporate governance.  
Edmans and Manso (2011) see a solution to this so-called ‘free-rider’ problem in using exit – 
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selling shares – rather than engagement through voice to express concern about corporate 
direction, another potential device to prod companies towards shorter-term considerations 
and against the policy flow.  
These factors impede the participation of willing and economically interested would-be 
stewards in the investment industry. But the investment landscape in general shows a 
number of developments that suggest even larger hurdles to the policy push, what Cheffins 
(2010) has termed the Achilles’ heel of a stewardship approach.  
Investment practices have undergone dramatic changes in the quarter of a century since 
the Cadbury Code (1992) defined corporate governance in the UK and many other parts of 
the world. In the early 1960s, individuals still owned more than half the value of shares on 
the London Stock Exchange. By the early 1990s, their holdings represented barely more than 
fifth, and what we now call traditional institutional investors held the bulk of UK equities, 
with pension funds being the largest category, with almost a third (see Figure 1), as pension 
investors sought to diversify their holdings away from government bonds in search of better 
performance. The growth of pension funds’ assets in equities began before the wave of 
privatisations that followed Margaret Thatcher election victory in 1979, but it accelerated 
thereafter.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
The era of pension funds as universal owners was not particularly long lived, however. 
Data from the UK Office of National Statistics show that pension funds gave up this leading 
position in part to insurance funds but in particular to overseas investors. By 2012, these 
‘rest-of-the-world’ investors owned more than 50% of UK equities (see Figure 2). Also 
growing were ‘other financial institutions’, from 0.4% in 1992 to 6.6% in 2012 (ONS, 2010, 
2013). This category benefited by the expansion of UK-based hedge funds during the past 
decade and a half. They reached a peak of more than 12% in the data for 2010, before falling 
as foreign hedge funds replaced UK ones as buyers on the UK market. Meanwhile, pension 
funds – the archetype of ‘universal owners’– in the UK now own less than 5% of shares in 
the UK equities market.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Indeed, the shifts in these ownership patterns were rather steady during the history of 
UK corporate governance codification. The four categories of ‘traditional’ institutions 
(pensions, insurance, unit trusts – or mutual funds – and investment trusts) peaked in their 
role at just over 60% of UK equities in 1992, just as the Cadbury Code was being drafted. 
Collectively they now own less than a quarter of the market.  
That the majority of UK equities are now held by foreign investors has a number of 
explanations. Sovereign wealth funds grew rapidly during this period, in particular in China 
and among oil-producing states, modelled on the successes of the Norwegian state oil fund 
and the investment funds of Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. US institutional investors also expanded 
overseas during this period, seeking asset diversification. Moreover, the character of UK 
equities markets changed radically as well. Big names in UK equities left the stock market 
either by being acquired (e.g. Cadbury Schweppes) or by collapse (Marconi). They were 
replaced in part by large foreign companies, including many from developing economies in 
Asia, Latin America and the former Soviet Union. They listed their shares on the London 
Stock Exchange in search of outside investors wanting the assurance that came with the 
British legal and regulatory system and with UK corporate governance standards. 
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Meanwhile, private equity supplied capital to a growing number of growth companies, 
leading to a sharp decline in the number of companies listed.  
Is it any wonder, then, that policy pronouncements for ‘stewardship’ by institutional 
investors fell on semi-deaf ears? Neither the investors nor the equities they were investing in 
bear particularly close relationship to the scope of interests represented in the UK 
Stewardship Code (Cf. Cheffins, 2010). Arguably sovereign wealth and some US-based 
pension funds share some characteristics of the universal owner, with their interests aimed at 
broad-based economic improvement over a long time. They should, therefore, favour a long-
term approach to their investments. But their beneficiaries are not particularly interested in 
the long-term health of the UK economy but rather in the long-term appreciation of capital in 
the funds, irrespective of national boundaries. They accept that their assets must, therefore, 
fail to match their liabilities. In accepting that principle, their stewardship duties will not 
correspond to the wishes of policymakers for a long-term orientation to UK companies and 
the UK economy, but rather to the trading profits possible in a market for corporate control 
(Manne, 1965, 1984) and in identifying the opportunities for gains in other economies and 
markets.  
These changes in investment practice suggest that the policy initiative is largely based 
on expectations of behaviour dating from an earlier point in history, at the start of the 
corporate movement when equity markets had a national character, rather than considering 
the current constellation of interests and motivations. Is it any wonder, then, that, Sir 
Winfried Bischoff, chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, should find that among the 
300 funds that signed up to its Stewardship Code, ‘too many signatories fail to follow-
through on their commitment’ (FRC, 2015, p. 1)? Is it any wonder that the version of 
‘ownership’ involving psychological commitment or even interest in ‘purposeful dialogue’ is 
difficult to initiate let alone to achieve?  
It is against this background that a new breed of activist shareholders, known with the 
moniker ‘activist hedge funds’, has moved to the centre of the corporate governance scene. 
Activist hedge funds appeared in the early 2000s when a number of hedge fund managers 
used their fund’s influence as minority shareholders to effect changes in the companies in 
which they invest. Hedge fund activism has emerged and flourished in the United States, and 
spread to other countries in Europe and Asia (for empirical evidence, see Katelouzou, 2015). 
But even if activist hedge funds can qualify as ‘stewards’ by enhancing shareholder 
value, their allegedly short-term investment horizons may undermine their status as 
‘owners’. A number of high-profile corporate actions where activist hedge funds were 
involved have invigorated a public debate about the perceived negative effects of hedge fund 
activism. Opponents of hedge fund activism have argued that they are often identified with a 
trading rather than an ownership mentality, and with vulture capitalism rather than the 
patient capital of the universal owner. For instance, activist hedge funds have allegedly 
sought to squeeze as much value as possible from the target company, forcing for dividend 
payouts, share buybacks, liquidation, buyouts or asset-stripping. Empirical evidence, 
however, suggests that activist hedge funds are in fact more long-term investors than the 
conventional wisdom might suggest, as the vast majority of activist hedge funds studied 
remained in the target for a period of more than one year, and with 39% of the total 
investments with an investment horizon of more than three years (Katelouzou, 2013). And 
previous empirical studies, however, refute the myopia theory and suggest that the activist 
hedge funds’ effect on their targets’ financial well-being is positive, although there are 
differing opinions as to whether the positive market reaction to hedge fund activism is 
simply due to a redistribution of wealth from creditors to shareholders (e.g. Klein and Zur, 
2009).  
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4. Alternatives ownership forms 
Policy may wish to promote dialogue and understanding alongside monitoring and control, 
but practice suggests that other conditions may prevail. Shifts in ownership patterns and the 
emergence of hedge fund activism raise questions about seeing the universal owner as a 
viable model for engaged investors. Shareholder empowerment seems to have stimulated 
confrontation more than dialogue. These disjunctions of policy and practice suggest a need 
to consider alternatives. How can policy help to break the cycle of performance and short-
termism affecting both companies and their investors? Let us accept that the days of loyal, 
private shareholders investing carefully their life savings in tiny proportions of the shares of 
most companies are a thing of the past, assuming they existed at all.  
The implication is that policy might be reset in ways to favour ownership forms that 
encourage long-term orientation of enterprises. In this section we consider alternative forms 
of ownership, other than the public listed company with a dispersed range of institutional 
investors. As the policy direction envisages a relational approach to ownership, let us 
consider, first, alternative forms of ownership, ones in which relationships play at least as 
strong a role as rights.  
4.1 Favouring founders and families 
Some current practices, especially in the UK, constrain the influence of founders and 
families in public companies, where differential voting rights are discouraged (a point we 
return to in the next section). In other countries, including the US, major institutional 
investors, including those that have long-term investment horizon and might qualify as 
universal owners see this as a policy objective. Yet family firms, including the family-led, 
Mittelstand companies in Germany and family controlled businesses elsewhere are often 
seen as paragons of a long-term orientation in decision making. As a result, we could 
consider policy alternatives that favour such companies, including preferential bidding rights 
for government business or tax incentives. 
Empirical evidence is mixed, however. On the one hand, empirical evidence finding that 
family owned firms outperform their peers might support an alternative view of families as 
‘stewards’(e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003). On the other hand, however, in a study of US 
listed companies with family control, Miller et al. (2013) find that such control created little 
differentiation (a source of strategic advantage) and provided little protection from 
isomorphic pressures. Institutionalisation may lead to a strong sense of compliance with 
norms, but it can also persist ever after the circumstances in which they arose have changed 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Moreover, a recent analysis (Cannella et al., 2015) provides 
reasons for policy not to conflate founder-led and family-controlled firms. Its findings 
include that longer decision horizons are associated with the tenure of directors for family 
firms, suggesting that practice plays a role in success as well as structure.  
In short, the evidence of successful long-term orientation is these types of firms is both 
nuanced and mixed. While a happy combination of founders’ zeal and families’ commitment 
can lead to successful outcomes, these conditions also bring risks. They seem to be neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions to prevent malfeasance or ensure strategic success.  
4.2 Favouring the state as owner 
The financial crisis led to rescues and (for a time) partial or full nationalisation of some 
financial institutions in a wide range of the most liberal of market economies (e.g. UBS in 
Switzerland, RBS in the UK, AIG in the US), and even of some industrial companies 
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(General Motors). In addition, the rapid growth and commercial successes of Chinese state-
controlled enterprises or ones with implicit state backing has led to fresh questions about the 
role of the state as owner. Moreover, the growth of sovereign wealth funds from resource-
rich economies, often with small populations, has offered another model of state-led equity 
investment (Lyons, 2007; Ungureanu, 2014). What unites these three disparate types of state 
ownership is the perception that the state’s interests lies in serving the long-term, strategic 
(economic and security) interests of the population as a whole. However, the dual role of the 
state as a shareholder-and-regulator remains understudied (Cf. Pargendler, 2012). 
The state is in some ways the archetype of the universal investor, but experience of state 
control in electoral democracies has not been so favourable. Politicians driven by election 
cycles seem to lack a long-term perspective in much the same ways identified as the problem 
of short-term oriented capital markets. In addition state ownership limits personal incentives 
for entrepreneurship and creativity and often involves a high degree of bureaucracy that 
manifests in stated-owned enterprises. This is where recent Chinese experience is of interest, 
with the state providing an ownership platform even as it stands back from management 
while conveying competitive advantage, at least in domestic markets against foreign rivals. 
4.3 Favouring collective ownership 
Mutual or collective ownership is often seen as the means to diminish the effects of short-
termism in capital markets. Colin Mayer (2013) argues the case for a return to an older form 
of management with concern for social welfare and more communitarian forms of 
ownership. In particular the success of the John Lewis Partnership, a UK-based retailer, has 
demonstrated that it is possible to combine a creative and strategic approach focused on 
long-term when ownership resides with the workforce and without hyper-aggressive 
incentives for top managers. Similarly traditional mutual organisations, owned by customers, 
have been held up as potential models for a return to a more communitarian approach, in 
particular for the financial sector. The John Lewis Partnership is an interesting model, but we 
wonder why it has seen so few imitators of its ownership structure. Perhaps it is because few 
companies have a founder uninterested in cashing out during his lifetime and who also has 
little desire to favour heirs over employees in inheritance.  
Collectives have downsides, too. While the building societies of Britain have (with a few 
notable exceptions) disappeared under competitive pressure from banks, we see a certain 
nostalgia for them seen in press discussion after the financial crisis and in the advertising 
campaign of the most prominent remaining one (The Nationwide). Indeed, the Co-operative 
Bank, a mutual with a commercial focus broader than building societies, was seen as part of 
the solution to the crisis as the government encouraged its desire to purchase branches of 
Lloyds Banking Group during the restructuring that followed Lloyds’ partial nationalisation. 
But its mutual status and collective governance did not prevent managerial excess that took a 
long time to discover (Myners, 2014). It had disastrous effects on the bank, leading it too to 
require a rescue, not this time by the state but instead through a capital injection from hedge 
funds, the supposed arch-enemy of long-term, patient capital.  
In a series of essays written for the Co-operative Press, Mullineux (2014) argues good 
governance of co-operatives depends upon being (again) local, which helps to overcome the 
separation of ownership and control and thus the agency problem. Yet in a field like 
banking, with its extensive regulatory requirements and dependency on investments in 
technology, scale economies are significant sources of competitive advantage and militate 
against such localism. In the face of globalisation of many aspects of business and the need 
for network effects to increase the usefulness of many products and services, the localism 
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associated with good governance of any commons has limitations as an alternative the 
corporate form.  
4.4 Favouring networks 
In considering the future of the corporate form, thinkers including Castells (2000) and many 
of the essays compiled in DiMaggio (2001) have argued that the speed of change, 
particularly in technology, and the resulting risk and uncertainty point towards structural 
reasons that favour the development of network relationships between firms. These go 
beyond mere supply-chain management in shared interdependence on other firms while 
retaining breaking down dependency relationships through the resilience that networks offer. 
Other scholars employ a different analogy drawn from the discourse of mobile telephony and 
computing – one of ecosystems – to describe how these constellations of companies operate, 
co-operate and co-evolve (Liu and Rong, 2015). 
This approach sees the unit of economic analysis as existing above the level of the firm 
itself, providing nimbleness to offset scale diseconomies, and allowing for the admixture of 
different organisational forms within the economic unit, and also experimentation in 
organisational design and in design of governance approaches. There have been cases of 
malfeasance in such networks, of course, and the resilience they offer may prevent 
contagion. But likewise institutional pressures seem likely to constrain such freedoms of 
action. Mimetic isomorphism may lead to the copying successful examples that do not quite 
fit the circumstances of another firm in the network. The normative isomorphism required 
for standardisation can impede inventiveness. And coercive isomorphism comes into play 
when one actor in the network dominates (consider the case of Apple and its ‘ecosystem’ of 
suppliers and developers. Moves favouring the network form of organisation also risk the 
erosion of the social function of the corporation that Davis (2013) decries. 
5. A research and policy agenda 
The potential shortcomings in each of these alternative ownership forms suggests a need 
in scholarship and policy for a better understanding of the concept of ownership as well as 
about the details of the workings of interactions between investors and corporations. With 
the UK as its central focus, our analysis is both illuminating and limited. The rise of 
international investment and the advent of hedge fund activism have changed the landscape 
of investment and put into doubt whether policy that rests even implicitly on the idea of the 
universal owners can achieve the desired aims.  
The alternative forms of ownership outlined above have benefits but also drawbacks. 
Collective ownership like the ‘John Lewis’ model has its advocates (Mayer, 2013), but 
collective ownership has also been known to result in poor monitoring and loss of control 
(Myners, 2014). Revisiting corporate law to make companies less like private property and 
more like a commons, i.e. ‘a shared resource whose sustainability depends on the 
participation of multiple constituencies in its governance (not just shareholders, but 
employees, core suppliers and customers’ (Deakin, 2012, p. 339), is worth exploring as an 
alternative to an investor-centric approach.  
As the policy direction envisages a relational approach to ownership, future research 
needs to consider alternative forms of ownership, one in which relationships play at least as 
strong a role as rights. This paper has considered some of these alternative forms of 
ownership. Future research might assess the drawbacks of each and whether institutional 
changes, including ownership rights, might help overcome some of their shortcomings while 
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retaining the advantages they have over the corporate form in encouraging a long-term 
orientation of enterprises. Might nimble small firms in resilient networks overcome the 
diseconomies of lack of scale and permit experimentation in ownership form within a 
functional economic unit? 
6. Conclusions 
Legal scholars have engaged in a sometimes heated debate over the value of enhancing 
shareholder rights (e.g. Bainbridge, 2013; Bebchuk, 2013). What we have examined here is 
something different, the possibilities arising from alternative ownership forms. 
This paper shows that the current policy direction of encouraging corporate-investor 
dialogue – engagement, commitment and stewardship – faces formidable obstacles, given 
the current state of capital markets and configurations of share ownership. It also suggests 
that both the scholarly literature and current practice in a variety of countries has engaged in 
a search for alternative approaches.  
What this paper does not do is advocate any of these, let alone all of them. Instead, fresh 
research into these alternatives and to encourage some experimentation may provide the 
ground for further research. Doing so will help us overcome the lack of evidence for policy 
and prepare us for the consequences when policy fails to keep pace with markets. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Statistics on this development are not consistently reported, but the Investment Company Institute 
in the US says that investments in funds of funds reached nearly $1.7 trillion in 2014, nearly three 
times the 2007 (pre-financial crisis) level, and more than eight times the level a decade ago (source: 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf). Funds of funds provide even broader diversification for 
retail investors within a single transaction than mutual funds, which in modern portfolio theory 
makes them low-risk investments. But it means the beneficiary is at least one step further from 
investing directly in and engaging with the end-investment object.  
2 The concept of policy ‘nudges’ became popular in policy circles around the world through the 
writings of behavioural economists Thaler and Sunstein (2009) and Sunstein’s subsequent work with 
the Obama administration in Washington. In outline, it draws on prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) to urge policy paths that influence choice by setting default options in policy-friendly 
directions, rather than imposing those directions.  
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Figure 1 - UK share ownership, 1992 (in percentage); source ONS 
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Figure 2 - UK share ownership, 2012 (in percentage); source: ONS 
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